No other law offers a better shield than the Internal Security Act: DPM Teo Chee Hean

Law allows Govt to take swift pre-emptive action, which makes it uniquely effective and relevant

TODAY, Teo Xuanwei, 20 Oct, 2011

In the face of ever-evolving security threats to the Republic, the Government finds that no other law offers a better shield to protect the country than the Internal Security Act.

And what makes it uniquely effective, and therefore relevant, is that it allows the Government to take swift, pre-emptive action to snuff out threats "before they cause us serious and possibly permanent harm", Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean said yesterday.

That is the security imperative for a small country at risk of "many powerful forces and influences that intersect here", said Mr Teo, who is also Coordinating Minister for National Security, as he addressed Parliament.

In a 30-minute speech, he set out the Government's most extensive position on the ISA since Malaysia decided last month to abolish the law.

That move led to calls by 16 former detainees for Singapore to do the same and a subsequent rebuttal of their claims by the Home Affairs Ministry.

Yesterday, he urged the House - which included Member of Parliament Janil Puthucheary (Pasir Ris-Punggol GRC), who spoke about the legislation on Tuesday - to think prevention first, and not in terms of prosecution like they would for other laws.

"The ISA allows an overall assessment of the threat posed by a person to be presented and considered in totality, unlike a criminal case that is tried before the courts which considers only specific acts directly related to that charge," he said.

This is why, said Mr Teo, it would be inadequate to replace the ISA with a specific Terrorism Act, for instance.

Such a legislation, if it did not have a broad scope and provisions for preventive detention like the ISA, would not have allowed "pre-emptive action against those who have not yet committed overt deeds that warrant prosecution, but nevertheless belong to a wider terrorist network".

So even if the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act - enacted in 2007 - had existed in 2001, the only liable individuals would have been the cell involved in taking manifest action to carry out the bombing plot then.

The legislation could not have been used against most of the Jemaah Islamiyah network, not all of whom were actively engaged in terrorist operations, stressed Mr Teo.

In contrast, the ISA "allows the Government to act quickly to prevent a threat from developing into something very serious such as a bombing; or to stem an organised pattern of subversion which promotes civil disturbances and disorder".

These are "considerable powers" bestowed to the Government, he acknowledged, but the ISA also contains "important safeguards which have been enhanced over time".

For instance, all ISA detentions are reviewed by an Advisory Board chaired by a Supreme Court judge. The law was tweaked in 1991 to give the Elected President veto powers over the Advisory Board's decisions.

The Government cannot act arbitrarily, or it can be challenged in court, said Mr Teo, who added that pre-emptive arrests and detention under the ISA have been carried out "in good faith and in a measured way".

"The Government has used the ISA as a last resort when there is a significant threat, and other laws are not adequate to deal with the situation," he said, reiterating several times that those arrested are often not eventually detained.

"It is the Government's view that this framework, including the safeguards, is unique and strikes an adequate balance in the present circumstances," he said.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Government used the ISA to battle the violent intents and acts of the Communist Party of Malaya, particularly when they infiltrated and hid behind organisations such as trade unions, the Barisan Socialis and the Catholic Church.

And in tracing how Singapore countered threats ranging from foreign subversion and espionage to religious and racial extremism, Mr Teo's point was also that other laws would probably not have adequately anticipated new forms of the terror threat.

The self-radicalised lone-wolf type has emerged in recent years, for instance, and Mr Teo cited the full-time National Serviceman who had intended to train under Al Qaeda and whom the Government detained preventively.

There would have been insufficient grounds to press charges against him under normal criminal legislation because he had not yet committed an offence.

"This avoided exposing Singapore to a high, perhaps unacceptable degree of risk. The consequence may not just be loss of innocent lives, but also serious damage to inter-communal relations and trust," he said.

As for calls to try terrorism cases in open court, he said that critical information, which terrorists could use to pursue their agenda, would have to be exposed.

"The disclosure of such information, which reveals current sources and methods of intelligence gathering would compromise ongoing or future counter-terrorism operations," he said.

"On the other hand, if the information is not disclosed in court, the case could be weakened because of evidentiary requirements in a court of law, the terrorist could be acquitted, and could walk free to pursue more terrorist activities."

Ultimately, it is not the judiciary who is accountable - or equipped to investigate and decide whether restraint is needed - for the country's security, he reminded the House.

"The ISA recognises that it is the elected Government which has to carry the heavy responsibility to assess what constitutes a serious threat to security, and to act on this assessment," he said.

Safeguards in the ISA

A person can only be held no more than 30 days from the date of arrest to facilitate investigation before a decision has to be made to either detain him under an Order of Detention (OD) not exceeding two years, issue him with a Restriction Order (RO) not exceeding two years, or release him unconditionally. If the decision is to serve an OD or an RO on a person, the President's assent must be sought before the expiry of the 30-day period.

Review by Advisory Board

Each OD and RO must be reviewed by the independent Advisory Board, which comprises a Supreme Court judge and two qualified citizens appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice. The board has all the powers of a court of law for summoning and examining witnesses, compelling the production of documents and evidence that it deems relevant, examining a detainee's representations, as well as examining Internal Security Department officers and statements of witnesses. The board considers the representation of the detainee within three months of the date of his OD and makes its recommendation to the President.

The board is required to review every OD and RO at intervals of no more than 12 months. A number of detainees have been released from their OD earlier on the board's recommendation.

Detainees' Right of Representation

A detainee must be informed of the grounds of detention and allegations made against him. The detainee has the right to make representations against his OD to the Advisory Board. For the purpose of enabling him to make representation, the detainee will be furnished with a statement in writing of the grounds on which the OD was made, as well as the allegations of facts on which the OD was based, and any other particulars that he may, in the opinion of the minister, reasonably require to make his representations against the order. The detainee is free to engage a lawyer or any person of his choosing who is not involved in the case to assist him in his representation to the board.

Veto power of the Elected President

An important check on the use of the ISA is the veto power of the President. Where any Advisory Board recommends the release of any person, he cannot be detained or further detained by the Government without the President's concurrence. This is a decision that the President can make in his own discretion. This veto power was accorded to the President in 1991 through amendments to the Constitution and the ISA.

Board of Inspection

Members of the Board of Inspection are empowered to make unannounced visits to the ISD detention centre. The board comprises more than 50 Justices of the Peace and community leaders, and two different members visit the detention centre every month to inspect the place and speak to any of the detainees without ISD officers being present. Detainees are able to convey requests and complaints to these board members who will report them, along with any other recommendations, to the Minister for Home Affairs.

Besides the Board of Inspection, a detainee also has access to a number of persons unassociated with ISD to whom he can raise a complaint of any nature. These include family members, the Advisory Board, legal advisers, religious counsellors, doctors and nurses.

The Katong Bomb Incident

Following the Internal Security Department's assessment that the communist threat during the Independence era was neutralised, the Singapore Government foresaw that the 1970s would be more peaceful. They were proven wrong.

Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean recounted this lesson yesterday, and disclosed examples of the security threats during that decade - in total, there were at least 35 arson and bomb incidents - to highlight the value of keeping the Internal Security Act.

In particular, he released to Members of Parliament details of what is known as the 1974 Katong Bomb Incident, an attempt by insurgent elements of the Communist Party of Malaya to target the managing director of the Nanyang Manufacturing Company.

The assassination bid was to support picketing workers outside the Nanyang Shoe Factory in Johor, which the company had shut down in July 1973. Repeated meetings between management and the workers' representatives had failed to resolve matters.

So, on Dec 20, 1974, three saboteurs made their way to plant home-made bombs at the Telok Kurau residence of the MD.

But at 5.30am, as their blue Austin, driven by a Singaporean and carrying his two Malaysian accomplices, was at the junction of East Coast Road and Still Road, one of the bombs exploded.

The driver, Gay Beng Guan, was injured and died in hospital two weeks later. The front-seat passenger, Lim Chin Huat, was killed instantly. The third man, Tan Teck Meng, seated at the rear, escaped with injuries.

Eyewitness reports said Tan had walked away from the wreckage. According to accounts from captured communists, he made his way to Bukit Panjang, where accomplices helped him to find refuge and medication before he was eventually smuggled into Johor by sea.

At the explosion site, the police recovered a banner - condemning the "persecution" of the shoe factory workers - pamphlets and three unexploded bombs, which were defused by the Singapore Armed Forces Bomb Disposal Unit.

The police also found two banners and three home-made bombs outside the North Bridge Road office of the Nanyang Manufacturing Company. The bombs were safely defused, too.

The document given to MPs summarised the 11-year period from 1970 to 1981 as the most intense period of security operations in Singapore, with the ISD arresting nearly 800 CPM elements.

"So while ordinary Singaporeans remember the 1970s as a peaceful time and largely went about their lives, intense security operations were continually being undertaken to preserve that peace," Mr Teo told the House.