Making sense of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014

Reminder that small states must defend themselves: PM Lee

By Andrea Ong, The Straits times, 7 Mar 2014

THE Ukraine crisis is a reminder that small countries must defend themselves and cannot rely solely on international treaties or the promises of others, said Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.

That is why Singapore must always maintain a strong armed forces and Home Team, he said in a Facebook post yesterday. It also needed a capable Foreign Affairs Ministry "to strengthen our ties with friends and allies". "Only then can Singapore be safe and secure," he said in his first comments on the Ukraine crisis.

While the Budget debate always focuses on local issues, he added, "we must not lose sight of what is happening in the outside world, and how faraway events can affect us".

He reiterated Singapore's condemnation of "any unprovoked invasion of a sovereign country, whatever the pretext". All countries must observe international law. "This is vital to a small country like Singapore."

Ukraine signed a 1994 deal to give up nuclear arms in exchange for Russia and America's agreement not to use force against it. "Yet Ukraine is in this predicament today," said Mr Lee.

Lessons from Ukraine crisis
Country size, risk of becoming pawn highlight Singapore's vulnerability
By Goh Chin Lian, The Straits times, 6 Mar 2014

THE crisis in Ukraine holds four lessons for a small city-state like Singapore, Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said yesterday.

Size matters in international relations, and a smaller country can become a pawn when squeezed between two big powers or blocs.

Treaties to safeguard a nation's security are meaningful only if they are enforceable, and finally, the United Nations Security Council cannot always act decisively to protect small countries.

Mr Shanmugam made these points to highlight Singapore's vulnerability in the rough and tumble of international politics, during the debate on his ministry's budget.

He warned: "It is a harsh world, with rules which are often ignored by many countries, including the major powers. Success is not preordained for any country, let alone a small city-state. We ignore that at our peril."

The minister focused the opening of his speech - traditionally to give his ministry's update on Singapore's foreign relations - on the international crisis sparked by the Feb 22 ousting of elected Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, followed by Russia seizing control of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula.

Mr Shanmugam said the crisis in Ukraine could affect the global economy, and hence, Singapore's.

Other countries are also watching the possible patterns of behaviour in the stand-off between a big country and a small one.

He cited the Crimean War over 150 years ago to show that Russia had always deemed its interests in Crimea as vital. Its actions against the Ottoman Empire then led to the war, which it lost.

While the parties' current considerations and plans are not known, Ukraine and its people would clearly have to face the consequences, he said.

He outlined Singapore's stance: It strongly objected to any unprovoked invasion of a sovereign country under any pretext or excuse. Russian troops should not be in Ukraine in breach of international law. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and international law, must be respected, with no qualifications.

This stand was in line with Singapore's emphasis that all countries, big or small, must observe international law, he said.

It has consistently opposed invasions, such as in Timor Leste and Cambodia, even when bigger powers like Indonesia and the former Soviet Union were unhappy about its stance, he added.

On the limits of a treaty for protection, he noted that Russia had signed an agreement in 1994 with the United States and Britain not to threaten or use force against Ukraine's territorial integrity or political independence, or exercise economic coercion.

But, he noted, "if Ukraine cannot defend the treaty, and has no partners which will come to its aid - and I mean with deeds, and not just words - then the treaty by itself will not help Ukraine".

Also, a small country which cannot protect itself puts its sovereignty and its people at risk, he said.

He noted that Russia is vastly bigger than Ukraine, and its armed forces much more powerful. Russia is also a nuclear power, while Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in the 1994 treaty.

Such lessons are why he could not agree with Nominated MP Laurence Lien's call on Tuesday for Singapore to have a more positive narrative grounded in optimism.

At least in foreign policy, "that would require one to ignore the facts and stop being realistic and honest with the people of Singapore", he said.

UKRAINE is on the brink of war following Moscow's decision to send troops into the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, a development which is threatening peace in Europe.

Global leaders, including United States President Barack Obama, have condemned the move. Here's a snapshot of views from different sources to explain the geopolitical backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, Moscow's calculations and and possible options for the West.
The Straits Times, 4 Mar 2014

What led to the current crisis in Ukraine?
By Steven Pifer, a former ambassador to Ukraine and director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, in the Brookings Institution's Up Front blog.

STRIKING the right balance between relations with the West and relations with Russia has always been Ukraine's central foreign policy challenge. Ukraine's leaders have sought to have it both ways: to grow relations with the United States, the European Union and Nato while also trying to maintain a stable relationship with Russia.

Ukraine regained its independence following the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. The Soviet system left the Ukrainian and Russian economies thoroughly intertwined. The Ukrainian energy sector remained hugely dependent on Russia for natural gas, oil and fuel rods for its nuclear reactors.

Historical and cultural links bind the two as well. For most of the 350 years leading up to 1991, Ukraine was part of Russia's empire.

Kiev deliberately built relations with the West as a counterbalance. In the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian government concluded a strategic relationship with the United States, a partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union, and a partnership arrangement with Nato.

In the late 1990s, then president Leonid Kuchma often described his foreign policy as "multi-vector", reaching out to Russia, Europe and the United States. He expressed interest in joining the European Union, but that was clearly not a realistic prospect any time soon.

A Ukraine moving towards the West seriously threatens Russian President Vladimir Putin's geopolitical construct. Moreover, he strives to appear to his domestic political base as a strongman and protector of Russia's national interests. "Losing" Ukraine would undermine that carefully cultivated image.

In January 2008, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko requested a membership action plan (MAP) from Nato. A few weeks later, Mr Putin stood next to Mr Yushchenko at a Kremlin press conference and calmly threatened to target nuclear missiles at Ukraine. The MAP request failed to win consensus support at the April 2008 Nato summit in Bucharest.

Fast forward to 2013. Ukraine, now under president Viktor Yanukovych, neared signature of an association agreement with the European Union, which includes a free trade arrangement. Its full implementation would prepare the ground for a future EU membership bid - and pull Ukraine irretrievably out of Moscow's orbit.

Mr Putin accordingly cranked up the pressure. Last summer, Russian customs inspectors began to block the import of Ukrainian goods. Kremlin officials threatened all manner of financial ruin should Kiev go forward with signing the agreement.

The threats worked. Mr Yanukovych suspended the association agreement process and instead accepted Mr Putin's gifts of a US$15 billion (S$19 billion) credit line and cheaper gas. But the European Union exerts a powerful pull. Tens of thousands took to the streets of Kiev in November in protest. Stoked by anger over brutal police tactics, the protest swelled to the hundreds of thousands, ultimately bringing down the Yanukovych regime.

What could be the thinking behind Russia's move?
By Matthew Sussex, director of the politics and international relations programme at the University of Tasmania, in The Interpreter blog published by Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy.

RUSSIA'S "hardline" behaviour stems directly from its experiences after the Cold War. As the leading republic of the former Soviet Union, Russia lost a great deal of territory and resources and a unifying national idea. The break-up also created a sizeable ethnic Russian diaspora population, much of which was subsequently mistreated.

The situation in Crimea is certainly a reflection of Russia's recent assertiveness. Yet it is equally a reflection of its insecurity. Moscow worries obsessively that Ukraine will be granted Nato membership.

Russia's Crimean move is part of a broader strategy to preserve sub-regional primacy. It is intended for both international and domestic audiences. By intervening in Crimea, Mr Putin's calculation is that it will show any vacillators how far he is prepared to go to secure Russian interests.

An equally important aspect of Russian strategy is to use the West's own logic against it. This makes it look hypocritical and ineffectual, and highlights how malleable "global" international legal and human rights rhetoric can be. Mr Putin's justification for intervening in South Ossetia in 2008 was the Responsibility to Protect. Similarly in Crimea, Putin is pushing the line that he is protecting ethnic Russians from right-wing nationalists. His message is simple: If the West can back a coup against a democratically elected government, Russia can too.

What are the options for the United States?
By Andrew Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Jeff Mankoff, a fellow and deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia programme at CSIS, on the CSIS website.

THE US has largely deferred to the Europeans throughout this crisis, while maintaining a line to ousted Ukrainian president Yanukovych through Vice-President Joe Biden.

Going forward, the US should ensure that it remains on the same page as its European partners, including contributing additional financial assistance as part of a transitional package.

While coordinating with Brussels is important, the United States has deferred too much responsibility to the EU and the International Monetary Fund, especially on the issue of fixing Ukraine's economy and ensuring that resources are available to assist the transition.

As in early 1992 in Russia, there is a short window of opportunity for US assistance to make a real difference. By failing to respond adequately to the needs and requests of the Boris Yeltsin government in early 1992, the US contributed to the breakdown of Russia's democratic experiment.

Washington needs to move quickly and with considerable strategic foresight to ensure that it does not repeat that mistake in Ukraine today.

Another area the US should focus on is making sure that Moscow remains very much in the loop, while trying to bridge the divide between Russia and the EU that has broken out over Ukraine in the past couple of years and urging Russia to play a constructive role in de-escalating the crisis.

As he did effectively last Friday, President Obama must be ready to continue to directly engage President Putin on occasion to ensure mutual understanding remains on track and to build trust.

This is not because Vice-President Biden or Secretary John Kerry are inadequate in any way; it is simply recognition of the fact that only the US President can engage the Russian President directly and that the Russian system is just a bit more centralised than ours.

 

Test of any Ukraine policy is in outcome
By Henry A. Kissinger, Published The Straits Times, 7 Mar 2014

PUBLIC discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which America did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.

Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side's outpost against the other - it should function as a bridge between them.

Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia's borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.

The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet - Russia's means of projecting power in the Mediterranean - is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and of Russia.

The European Union must recognise that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine's relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.

The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 per cent of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other - as has been the pattern - would lead eventually to civil war or break-up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West into a cooperative international system.

Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrate that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Mr Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Ms Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise US policy towards Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.

Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonisation of President Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.

Mr Putin should come to realise that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the US needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Mr Putin is a serious strategist - on the premises of Russian history. Understanding US values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of US policymakers.

Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:

- Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

- Ukraine should not join Nato, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

- Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility towards Russia.

- It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea's relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognise Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea's autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.

These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift towards confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.

The writer was US Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.

TRIBUNE CONTENT AGENCY

Why crisis in faraway Ukraine matters to Asia
One ripple effect: Asian countries, alarmed by Russia's actions, may seek closer alliances with US in hopes of preventing Crimea-like scenario in region
By Jonathan Eyal, The Straits Times, 31 Mar 2014

CHINA'S diplomats have every reason to feel satisfied with their handling of the Ukraine crisis.

On the one hand, China expressed its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, an implicit rebuke to Russia, which seized Ukraine's Crimea region.

But at the same time, Beijing has abstained from all anti-Russian votes at the United Nations, and let it be known that it won't be supporting anti-Russian sanctions.

Beijing's determination to have its cake and eat it, to be caught neither on Russia's side nor on the West's, is based on the assumption that whichever way the stand-off over Ukraine is resolved, China stands to gain from the crisis.

Yet, such assumptions are fundamentally misconceived. For the Ukraine episode is a misfortune for Asia as a whole. And China may soon discover that, far from being an indirect beneficiary, the crisis in far-away Ukraine will confront Beijing with new and costly security challenges.

It is easy to see why, at least in the short term, China may benefit from events in Ukraine. An isolated Russia subjected to Western sanctions will be far more willing to sell oil, gas and weapons to China on preferential terms; Mr Igor Sechin, Russian President Vladimir Putin's top energy boss, admitted as much in comments to the media last week.

Can China copy the Russian model?

A UNITED States concerned with handling a European crisis will have far less time to deal with its "pivot" to Asia. And, although nobody in China suggests that Beijing should copy the Russian model of grabbing territory, the fact that the Russian action has met with no serious reaction from the US must serve as an inspiration for Chinese strategists who hope that their country may one day be able to resolve its own territorial disputes in a similar manner.

For if the Russians can subdue Crimea - a relatively large territory with two million inhabitants - in a few days and without firing a shot in anger, why can't China do the same to a few strings of uninhabited rocks?

All very true but only part of the story. The more one looks at the potential ramifications of Ukraine, the higher the fears that everyone in Asia - including the Chinese - will be affected by this European crisis.

The fact that force was used to change borders in Europe may not alarm China unduly. But the methods that Russia resorted to in occupying Crimea, and the justifications it made for this action, should elicit deep concern, even in Beijing.

Russia claimed to itself a right to use force in any neighbouring country where ethnic Russians may be in danger, and is now distributing Russian passports to all its diaspora in order to reinforce this claim. Russia also held a snap referendum in Crimea in order to justify the incorporation of that Ukrainian province into Russian territory, elevating what it likes to call "self-determination" as a principle justifying territorial changes.

Both these ideas are toxic for Asian security. The Russian model of offering "protection" to its "co-nationals" may become attractive to some Chinese nationalists who are already arguing that Beijing has not done enough to protect ethnic Chinese in other countries. But the more someone in Beijing may be tempted to copy the Russian example, the more ethnic Chinese throughout Asia will be treated with suspicion; the nexus between ethnic minorities and their so-called "mother state" was responsible for unleashing two world wars in Europe.

And holding referendums in order to decide borders is precisely the kind of principle China does not want to see established.

The results of such a vote in, say, Xinjiang or Tibet are fairly predictable. And while China has the resources necessary to ensure these votes never take place, what can Beijing do if the fashion for referendums is picked up in Taiwan and Hong Kong?

Strategic challenges for Beijing

NOR are many of the strategic benefits, which China assumes it can derive from the Ukraine crisis, that real.

Take the prospect of increased deliveries of Russian oil and gas as an example. It is true that, as Europe seeks to diversify its supplies away from a hostile Russia, the Russians will be forced to sell their energy products to China, their next big market.

And it's equally true that in this buyers' market, the Chinese will be able to call the price.

But shifting supplies away from Europe to Asia is a gigantic task. Russia will have to build the same networks of pipelines it currently has in Europe - an effort that won't leave much change from an estimated US$50 billion (S$63 billion), and will require years, if not decades.

Meanwhile, China may be called upon to defend the energy resources it has already secured in Central Asia. Until now, the Chinese were winning the battle for influence in Central Asia against the Russians - the region's old colonial masters - in a patient, peaceful way, through offers of trade opportunities that Russia can never match.

But victory in Ukraine may encourage the Russians to reassert their influence in Central Asia, where large pockets of ethnic Russians live.

The northern part of Kazakhstan, Central Asia's biggest and richest nation, is entirely dominated by ethnic Russians who can be easily incorporated into Russia proper, especially since, like in Ukraine, Russia can use military bases it already has throughout the region for this purpose. In short, the Ukraine crisis can make China's northern borders with Central Asia less, rather than more secure.

Impact on US pivot to Asia

BUT the most important error that the Chinese or anyone else in Asia could make is to assume that the Ukraine crisis will translate into a reduced Asian footprint for the US, or in a diminished American global reputation.

Barring an actual war with Russia, which nobody currently predicts, the US can contain Russian power in Europe without pouring in new military resources by simply galvanising its European allies in the Nato alliance to do things differently. A shift of Nato bases and soldiers from their current western European locations to the territory of central and eastern Europe will be relatively swift and cheap, but sufficient to pin down the Russian military for years to come.

So, the Ukraine crisis may end up having no impact on the "rebalancing" of US forces to Asia, which could continue.

Indeed, the pivot may actually intensify if, as a result of the current showdown with Russia, the US Congress refuses to accept the cuts which President Barack Obama has pencilled in for the US armed forces.

Nor is it true, as some Chinese analysts have privately suggested, that the US' decision to do nothing in response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine has devalued the credibility of the US security guarantees to other nations.

Ukraine is not a member of either Nato or the European Union, and the US pledge to that country's security was in the realm of the moral, rather than legal.

What the Ukraine episode has shown is that, as Professor Victor Cha of Georgetown University in the US shrewdly put it, "power matters less than commitment".

As powerful as the US remains, it was not committed enough to Ukraine's security to use its formidable strength to defend that country's integrity. Yet, the lesson that Asian nations will draw from this is not that US security guarantees are now worthless but rather, that in order to make sure that such guarantees remain effective, Washington's Asian partners will have to work harder to reinforce US commitment to their security. And that's precisely what Japan and South Korea - to name but a few of the region's nations - are now doing.

Nobody should therefore see the Ukraine crisis as anything but a misfortune, and the response may be a tightening of alliances with the US and a greater quest for regional collective security arrangements, as the only structures capable of preventing a repetition of a Ukraine-like scenario in Asia.

That much was clear when the UN General Assembly last week adopted a resolution supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity - the only Asian country that voted with Russia was North Korea.

With friends like these, Russia no longer needs enemies.

A Russian perspective on media coverage of the crisis in Ukraine
By Dmitry Ryakhovskiy, Press Secretary to the Russian Embassy in Singapore, Published The Straits Times, 21 Apr 2014

I WISH to offer a Russian perspective to the slanted coverage of the Ukrainian crisis by Western mainstream media, including reports and analyses by wire agencies like Reuters and Bloomberg which newspapers everywhere including The Straits Times subscribe to and publish. Much has been said about the violation of domestic Ukrainian legislation when the Crimeans opted to secede from Ukraine to join Russia. This view persists even though an overwhelming 97 percent of Crimeans voted for secession thus exercising the right to self-determination which is prominently embodied in Article I of the United Nations (UN) Charter and has been reaffirmed on many occasions by the UN General Assembly. It should be noted that Kosovo in the former republic of Yugoslavia declared independence in 2008 without any referendum or voting at all; and more than 100 nations recognised its independence. 

The former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic itself violated Soviet legislation when it seceded from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union in 1991 notwithstanding the fact that about 77 percent, or more than two thirds of the those who voted in the referendum favoured the preservation of the Soviet Union. Does the logic follow that it is only good when Russia is split, and bad only when Russians re-unite? The world welcomed the re-unification of East and West Germany, so why there all the fuss when Russians re-unite?

Does it mean that Ukraine had the right to secede from the USSR but that Crimea does not have the right to secede from the Ukraine? Isn't this a blatant application of double standards? When Ukrainians took to the streets to protest in Kiev against a President they did not like, they were dubbed "good guys" by the West. Yet, when Russians and Ukrainians protest in eastern Ukraine, they are called "separatists and terrorists". Why wasn't there a fuss about the change of borders in Europe when the USSR broke up? Or when the United States and its European allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) bombed and dismembered Yugoslavia? Until today, adults and children in the former Yugoslavia are suffering the fatal effects of cancer as a result of uranium-infused bombs dropped by Nato. Has there been significant Western reportage about such a horrific phenomenon? Or does anyone care that the American-led invasion in Iraq resulted in a million victims? How much analysis was there in Western media about the illegal coup in Kiev in the abrogation of international law when the country's legal President was forcibly ousted and replaced, effectively, by ultra-nationalists? Does anyone in the West remember when blaming Crimea and Russia that the crisis in Ukraine began with the coup in Kiev- one more capital where notorious policy of forced regime-change was again applied? How can the world, and the media, allow hypocrisy to plumb such deplorable depths?

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