Today, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam arrives in Cambodia for the royal cremation of the late former king Norodom Sihanouk, who passed away last October. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who visited Phnom Penh on Oct 12 last year to pay tribute to the late former king, wrote that Singapore will never forget the crucial role he played in fostering the enduring friendship between the two countries. Asad Latif traces the close ties between Singapore and Cambodia and how the two small states stood by each other in times of need.
The Straits Times, 4 Feb 2013
CAMBODIA'S late former king Norodom Sihanouk, who died last October and will be cremated in Phnom Penh today, was instrumental in forging an extraordinarily close relationship with Singapore.
Just before Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965, there were calls in certain political quarters there for the arrest of then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his close associates.
In response, writes the scholar Michael Leifer, plans were drawn up for the People's Action Party to set up a government-in-exile in Cambodia because of the special relationship that had been established with its head of state, then known as Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
Mr S. Rajaratnam, who was supposed to set up that government, was once asked about those plans. The former foreign minister replied that there had been "such a vague thought which was dissipated by events".
What did not dissipate were the close ties between the two countries. Cambodia was one of the first countries to recognise Singapore's independence.
In his memoirs, Mr Lee remembers Cambodia as "that oasis of peace and prosperity in the war- torn Indochina of the 1960s".
He recalls a visit to Cambodia in 1962: "Phnom Penh was like a French provincial town, quiet and peaceful with wide boulevards reminiscent of the Champs Elysees in Paris lined with trees and flanked by side roads also shaded by trees."
True to its foreign policy of neutrality in the Cold War, Cambodia had sided with neither the communists nor the Americans. But this had not prevented it from getting sucked into the Indochina conflict. Turned into a heartrending scene of atrocities, from illegal carpet-bombing by the Americans to mass killings by the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia became a by-word for the horrors of war that culminated in its invasion by Vietnam on Dec 25, 1978.
By working assiduously through Asean, Singapore sought to reverse the Vietnamese occupation. What was at stake went beyond the close ties: It touched on the security of countries, particularly small states such as Cambodia and Singapore.
Speaking at an Asean meeting in Bali in June 1979, Mr Rajaratnam remonstrated with his audience: "Remember, if we don't stand by the people of Kampuchea today, who will stand by us should we have to shout for help ourselves one day?"
From Phnom Penh to Kabul, a document published by Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1980 focused on the key issue of sovereignty in its analysis of the Cambodian conflict.
Small nations, it argued, should be alarmed by any attempt to condone "the armed overthrow of even a hateful government by a foreign army". This was a reference to the government of Democratic Kampuchea, led by the Khmer Rouge despot Pol Pot, which the Vietnamese had overthrown in what some saw as an act of deliverance for the Cambodians.
Although the Khmer Rouge regime was an odious one, Democratic Kampuchea should keep its seat at the United Nations because it was the legal government of Cambodia, Singapore declared. If this did not happen - or even if the country's UN seat were left vacant - this would legitimise a blatant act of aggression committed by one state against another.
Commenting on the Heng Samrin government that the Vietnamese had installed in Phnom Penh, the document pointed out that in February 1979, it had signed a treaty with Vietnam containing a clause that allowed for Vietnamese troops to be invited in.
Singapore noted the ominous implications of this arrangement: "First invade a country. Then set up a front organisation which will sign a treaty requesting outside armed intervention after the invasion has taken place, and all would be perfectly legal." Obviously, this precedent could not be allowed to stand.
Singapore therefore embarked on a vocal condemnation of Hanoi's designs at the UN and elsewhere. It played a major role in formulating a common Indochina policy for Asean to prevent the situation in Cambodia from becoming irreversible because of international acquiescence or disinterest.
Mr Wong Kan Seng, who was Foreign Minister from 1988 to early 1994, has said that Asean's core objectives throughout the Cambodian crisis were primarily threefold. First, there was a need to prevent the Vietnamese occupation from becoming a fait accompli. Second, it was necessary to persuade Vietnam to come to the negotiating table. Third, there was a need to ensure a peaceful and negotiated settlement which would allow the Cambodian people the right to self-determination and independence.
Against this background, the diplomatic offensive against Vietnam scored a major political success in September 1981 when Prince Sihanouk, Democratic Kampuchea premier Khieu Samphan, and the anti-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front leader Son Sann met at the Shangri-La Hotel here.
They agreed to set up an ad hoc committee to work towards a coalition government. Established in Kuala Lumpur a year later, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea prevailed at the UN with Asean's support.
Asean unity itself, though, was far from assured. Thailand, whose borders were threatened by the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, benefited from the pressure that China kept up on the invaders. Indeed, Beijing's military action against Hanoi in February 1979 helped contain Vietnamese expansionism.
But Indonesia was concerned with ensuring that Vietnam remained strong enough to block a Chinese thrust into South-east Asia. Navigating a way through such positions was not easy, but concentrating on the key factor of Vietnamese aggression helped to keep Asean focused.
The collapse of global communism in 1989 paved the way for the eventual resolution of the Cambodian issue. The Paris Peace Agreements of 1991, which created the framework for a comprehensive political settlement, were signed by Cambodia and 18 other nations in the presence of the UN secretary-general. Singapore's doggedness in insisting on Cambodia's sovereignty was vindicated when a free Cambodia joined Asean in 1999.
Singapore had repaid its debt of gratitude to the country which had been quick to embrace its independence. In the process, Singapore's diplomacy came of age as its officers learnt to deal with major powers and work with international institutions such as the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement.
Mr Mark Hong was Singapore's charge d'affaires in Cambodia from 1974 to 1975, when his tour of duty was cut short by the capture of the capital by Khmer Rouge forces.
"It is clear that with the passing of King Father Sihanouk, a new era has dawned," the retired diplomat told The Straits Times.
The "working relationship" between Cambodia and Singapore today is a cordial one which, in the Asean spirit, is based on consultations, cooperation and mutual respect.
This relationship will no doubt shape their interactions as South- east Asia once again becomes a theatre of change.
The writer, a former Straits Times journalist, is an associate fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
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